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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -

SENATE

November 21,., 1970

town will take my remarks seriously, because the fault is not entirely on one side.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I
want to add my commendation to those
of my colleagues to the distinguished
senior Senator from Vermont for the remarks he made this morning. As always ,
listening to Senator AIKEN is educational. When he speaks, it is like a breath of
fresh air. His candor is commendable.
His integrity, his ability, and his honesty
are unquestioned. Would that we had
more GEORGE AIKENS. The country would
be a good deal better off.
I agree with the distinguished Senator
in his call for bipartisanship. I have been
aware of the fact that in all too many
discussions in this body there have been
those who have a t tacked, those who have
defended, and very few who have understood the gray area in between. The fault
lies not wholly with the White House,
nor does virtue lie wholly within the confines of the Senate. We have both made
our share of mistakes.
I would hope, in the interest of the
Nation, the responsibility which the Senate has shown during the past 2 years
will continue, and that all of us will work
together-the legislative and the executive-to end that the Nation will come
ahead of any particular party.
ORDER OF BUSINESS
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Under the previous order, the Senator from Montana is recognized for 15
minutes.
FOREIGN AID POLICY
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, this
has been a troubled and confusing and
agonizing weekend. We have been confronted with a request for tens of millions of dollars in aid for Cambodia, in
addition to aid for Indonesia, Vietnam,
K orea, Lebanon, Jordan, and Israel.
In all those areas, only one part was
previouslY authorized, and that is the
$500 million credit to Israel, which was
incorporated in the defense authorization bill, agreed to some weeks ago. The
others are not authorized and will be the
subject of hearings in committee and debate on the ftoor of the Senate.
I can find justification for assistance
to Jordan and Lebanon in the sum of
$30 million and $5 million, respectively,
because it will tend to stabilize the situation in the Middle East; and the credits
to Israel w!ll tend to keep us from becoming involved physically. I do not
wa nt to see this Nation become involved
physically anywhere else in t he world
unless it is in the interest of our own
security; and when I say I do not want
to see any more Vietnams, I mean it, beca use even one Vietnam is too much.
I can understand also the reason for
the aid-proposal for Korea, because it is
tied to a drawdown of 20,000 American
troops from that country.
I can understand it in South Vietnam,
because it is tied to the continued withdr awal of U .B. troops. Hopefully t hat will
be accelerated.
But I find it difficult to locate any
compensating factors as far as the Cam-
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bodian-aid proposal is concerned. It appears to me that if we act on the basis
of this request, we will just be making a
second downpayment, because the first
has already been made over the past few
months by aid transfers to Cambodia
through withdrawals from funds which
had originally been allocated to Taiwan,
Greece, and TUrkey.
As to the sit uations which developed
over the weekend. I am concerned. I am
uneasy. When you tie the request for aid
to Cambodia with t he 250-plane flight
over North Vietnam, with the commando
raid some 23 miles west of Hanoi, I think
we have a set of circumstances which
should cause us concern.
I grieve for all Americans, dead and
wounded, whether they are in POW
camps, whether they have been killed or
wounded in action, or whether they have
been casualties in Indochina other than
in action. According to the latest figures
which I have-and this is out of date
now, because it goes only to November 7
of this year-291,559 Americans have
been wounded, 43,959 have died in combat, and 8,798 h ave died from other
causes. The total dead about 3 weeks ago
stood at 52,757 and the total casualties,
dead and wounded, at 34i,316.
I grieve for those men, as I have said,
because they are car rying out their obligation in a war which is highly unpopular and, in my opinion, totally unnecessary-a war which is one of the
great tragedies in the annals of this Republic, a war which is causing a continuing drain on the morale of the American people, a war which makes the troubles confronting us at home much more
ditncult to confront.
I was heartened by the President's negotiating proposals of October 7, because
I thought they contained a good deal of
substance, and tied in with the proposals
from Hanoi of September 17. It was my
belief that the groundwork for possible
negotiations had been laid. I still think
that is the case. But now I wonder about
the possibility of reinvolvement, based on
the raids north. I wonder about the reaction of Hanoi to the commando raid
and these retaliatory air raids for the
shooting down of a U.S. reconnaissance
plane. I wonder about the situation
which.confronts the prisoners of war, and
whether the commando raid will be helpful or harmful; and I would wonder no
less even if the ra id had been successful,
because it has placed those prisoners in
a very ditncult position, and we do have
to think of them at all times.
Then I wonder about the effect these
events may have on the Paris talks-!
emphasize the word "talks," because negotiations have not as yet gotten underway.
All these things are matters which the
Senate should consider, which the administration should consider, and hopefUlly, in the words of the distinguished
Senator from Vermont and on the basis
of his sage advice, that we would consiQ,er
together, so that we could work in common for the common good.
There has been some talk about an
understanding between North Vietnam
and Uiis Government relative to the use
of reconnaissance planes over the past

2 years. Frankly, I know of no such understanding. There may be one, but it so,
I am totally unaware of it. I am assuming
that an understanding is being asswned
on our part; that on the basis of the stoPpage of the bombing of the North, it was
tacitly understood- we asswned-that
we would be given the right to continue
reconnaissance fiights.
I would point out that history seems to
prove that air power is not the weapon
which so many advocates seem to think it
is. To see what it does one needs only look
to England as an example, or to North
Vietnam in the past. The end result is
d~mage temporarily, but a stiffening of
the spine of the people bombed for a long
period of time.
The President does have a responsibility. His is the Ultimate responsibility.
But, as the distinguished Senator from
Vermont has indicated. we also have a
responsibility.
It woUld do us no good to give up and
lie down. because then we would be shirking our duty. We can and we should, in
good conscience, support the President
when we think he is right, and suoport
him fUlly But, also in good conscience,
when we think the President has made a
wrong move, we have the right and the
responsibility to disagree, and to do so on
a constructive basis, so that the relationship between the two segments of our
Government will not be ruptured as a resUlt.
May I say that I admire the courage of
the commandos who undertook this raid
in an attempt to free some American
POW's. It was a bold stroke. Those men
who participated in it are entitled to the
highest commendation. But I also raise
the question as to the reliability of our intelligence.
I recall, for example, that when we
moved into Cambodia, it was to capture
the so-called headquarters of the North
Vietnamese and the Vietcong-a headquarters which, incidentally, was never
discovered. Evidently, as the basis for this
recent commando raid, we were again depending on what we thought was reliable
intelligence, but according to the reports
which appeared in the press, that camp
had been evacuated at least 2 weeks before. It was a successful penetration, but
the objective was not achieved. My concern now is for the prisoners of war who
are still being held in North Vietnam,
and what the reaction by North Vietnam
to this raid by air and by land will be on
them. Their future is something all of us
must keep in mind; their safety is something which all of us devoutly pray for.
I wonder if the Senator from Vermont
noticed, in the Washington Post yesterday, a swnmary of a recent special edition of the Foreign Service Journal. Before I carry this further, Mr. President, I
ask unanimous consent that that swnmary, in an article entitled "Nixon Doctrine Battles Those Who Must Use It,"
written by Murrey Marder, and published
in the Washington Post of Monday,
November 23, 1970, and another article
entitled "Viet War: A New Version,"
written by Stanley Kamow, and also
published in yesterday's Washington
Post, be printed in the RECORD at the conclusion of my remarks.
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The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.
<See exhibits 1 and 2.)
Mr. MANSFIELD. Both articles are
relevant to what the Senator from Vermont has so ably stated. One is a frank
exposition of the reaction of professional U.S. diplomats to the Nixon doctrine
in Asia. The other· by Mr. Karnow
touches on the basic factor that seems to
trap successive administrations-including the present administration-in this
unending involvement in Indochina notwithstanding efforts to terminate it.
The swnmary of the special issue of the
Foreign Service Journal points out that
many of our diplomats who are closely
involved in Asian affairs were fearfUl of
the sweeping change In policy implicit in
the Nixon doctrine when It was first proposed. In due course, however, they came
to see that the implied change really was
not going to be much of a change at all
and that the Idea of "lowering our profile" a little might actually have some
virtue.
One may wonder at their reactions,
now, after even this modest scaledown
seems to be in the process of abandonment, with the renewed expansion of the
battle area by the bombing of North
Vietnam and by this recent abortive attempt to free prisoners of war near
Hanoi. One may wonder, too, at the Implications of the Cambodian aid request
for the Nixon doctrine which, I should
note, I have supported since its inception
as an expression of a long-needed change
in policy to the end that It might lead
us out of this tragic and misbegotten
military involvement on the Asian mainland.
In any event, I am led by those
articles to address certain questions.
I am sure the Senator from Vermont
would concur that it the Nixon doctrine
has .a fundamental purpose, It is to ''lower
the U.S . profile'' so as to reduce and
terminate in a progressive fashion the
excessive involvement of the United
States on the Asian mainland, a situation brought about largely by the presence of our military forces and by military or other massive aid.
Mr. AIKEN. What I tried to point out
was that we should have a uniform interpretation of the Nixon doctrine for
all countries, and not one interpretation
for one country and one for another. If
the Nixon doctrine is good for Southeast
Asia, it is, of course, good for most of
the rest of the world. We do not want
one interpretation of it for Vietnam, another for Nigeria, a third for Chile, or
perhaps a fourth for some other part of
the world.
· I have told the State Department, for
whatever good it may do, that our ambassadors in foreign countries should all
be given uniform interpretations of the
Nixon doctrine and just what it means.
As I pointed out, the Cooper-Church
amendment in no way confiicted with the
Nixon doctrine. In fact, it supported it.
Yet, it was interpl'eted as being a hostile
act on the part of Congress.
Mr. MANSFIELD. I would agree with
the Senator completely. I concur in what
he has to sa,y about the Cooper-Church
amendment, it was in accord with what
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I understood to be the Nixon doctrine as
it has been enunciated and propounded
by the White House and the State Department.
I should like to ask the Senator
another question.
Does the Senator think that the Nixon
doctrine is served by the recent bombing
of North Vietnam? To put it another
way, does that action raise or "lower the
profile of the United States in Asia"? Is
it likely to shorten or prolong the time
it wlll take to get our military forces out
of all Indochina?
Mr. AIKEN. I think the answer to
those questions is perfecUy obvious. It
does not improve our profile in the rest
of the world. It will not improve our
prospects of getting completely out of
the war in Southeast Asia at &al early
~te.
'
In fact, we have been through this before. The majority leader may remember
the day we were called to the White
House, along with several of our colleagues, to be advised that we would undertake the bombing of North Vietnam;
and it was pointed out that a few bombs
dropped on them would ooon bring them
to their knees and they would be begging
for peace.
Mr. MANSFIELD. The Senator is correct.
Mr. AIKEN. The Senator may recall
that I protested rather vigorously to the
President, Mr. McNamara, and SecretarY Rusk, but they went ahead with it.
I believe we lost a thousand planes, including many of our finest aviators, and
something like 500 helicopters. I fear
that these new raids, these incursions! hope they are incursions and not a
prelude to any invasion-wlll simply delay the end of the war, just as the initial
bombing of North Vietnam.
I do worcy about the effect which this
failure to rescue prisoners o! war-in
spite of the fact that it was bravely carried out--may have on the more than
450 Americans now. being held. I believe
that we cannot abandon those people.
The South Vietnamese hold about 30,000
prisoners of war. North Vietnam holds
over 450 hostages, according to our best
estimates. Certainly, we are not going to
abandon the hostages who are held by
the North Vietnamese, and the war wll1
not be over until they have been accounted for and released.
I certainly appreciate the remarks of
the Senator from Montana in regard to
this whole matter. It points up the need
for better understanding.
I understand, Mr. President, that perhaps two or three Members of Congress
were called in the middle o! the night to
be advised that the resumption of the
air raids on Vietnam was in effect. But
that is not consultation.
Mr. MANSFIELD. No. But I would say
it is a continuation of an old policy in
which certain members have been informed after the fact. That happened in
previous administrations as well.
Mr. AIKEN. The Senator may recall
that the previous President, the predecessor to President Nixon, used to advise
us shortly before the !act, a few hours in
advance, and then asked us to keep still
about it, which we did.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I appreciate the remarks of the distinguished
Senator from Vermont.
I ask unanimous consent that excerpts
from my interpretation of the Nixon
doctrine, as contained in a report I made
to the Committee on Foreign Relations
and to the President in a private capacity, a year ago last August, be printed at
this point in the RECORD.
There being no objection, the excerpts
were ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows :
PERSPECI'IVE ON AsiA : THE NEW U.S.
DOCTRINE AND SOUTHEAST AsiA

(Report of Senator MIKE MANsFIELD to the
Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S.
Senate)
Today, there are treaties and executive
agreements and an accumulation of decisions of the executive branch which enmesh
this Nation deeply In the affairs of Southeast
Asia. In consequence, there are over 600,000
U.S. troops In South VIetnam and 60,000 In
Thailand. In the general area and at least
partially connected with our Involvement In
Southeast Asia are 40,000 men In Japan;
45,000 In Okinawa; 10,000 In Taiwan; 60,000
In the 7th Fleet; ' 30,000 In the Philippines
and additional thousands on Guam-In all, a
figure approaching 800,000.
Whatever the Initial validity at these Immense conunttments, there Is growing doubt
as to whether It Is wise or beneficial :for this
Nation e.nd the countries concerned to perpetuate the present state of a.ffa:lr!;. In the
first place, the Independence at Asle.n countries would be hollow Indeed I! ~t ~nvolved
merely an exclhange o! a pest colonial status
for the Indefinite prop of U.S. support. From
our own point of view, moreover, the United
States Is feeling the adverse effects o! the
prolonged expenditure at lives and enorm.ous
resources and energy abroad, most at i t In
VIetnam and Southeast A.sta.
In the •llllter1m, needs 1llt home have been
neglected- needs which are too obviOUB and
omnipresent to require cataloging. They a.re
all around us whetiher we live 1n cities ocr
on fe.rm.s, whether our homee e.re In New
York, Washington, California, the Midwest,
ocr Monte.na. The solution at these IPrc:Jblems-whether they Involve equality of treatment or pollution of air and water, or education, or public sa.!ety, or tre.nsportatlon
and roads, or whatever-will require great
and sustained Inputs at lnt.1llwtlve e.nd Rttentlon at a tlma when these assete &ire hesvllly
diverted abroad. They wiLl also require substantial public funds In R period of lntla.tlon
and of heavy tax burdens which l'e&ult in
large measure from military eX>pendltures
overseas and, notably, from the war In VIetnam.
While urgent. needs at home are neglected,
tlhere Is deep ooncern over the we.r In Vletns.m which Is still without an end In sight.
The conf!1ct con1llnues to result In addl·
tlonal American dead e.nd wounded every
week and In expendl.tures at . the rate at
about
million an hour. Moreover, elsewhere In Southeast Asia there are shadow
wars and the pockma.rlal of violent Internal
dissension. That these situations, under our
present course, m.lg'ht evolve in the pe.ttern
of Vletnam gives rise 'to furtlher concern.
Doubts as. to our Asian 8ipproo.ch are also
fed by the vi.!Jible consequences of the mase
entry of American soldiers, money, and ol!lclal establishments Into Boutheeat Asia. To
be sure, this entry has brought a gTeat lnf!ow
of wealth and modern technology. In some
places, however, !little that Is construct!ve Is
v1sJble as a result. The very magnitude at
the American Involvement, em.erglng' as It
has In a EhOl't spa.n at tlme, has Imposed e.n
almoot Indigestible allen presence e.nd pr&clpltated severe cultural conVUilslons.
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To date, we have acted on the scale that
we have In Southeast Asia largely to support
small nations against what has been calculated as the threat of Communist aggression-notably from China. In fact, there was
little expression of fear In any of the
countries visited of an attack or Invasion
!rom China. Considerable concern does exist
however, that Internal Insurgent movemenu;
whose origins lie In local grievances or conf!lcts will be used as spearheads to Influence
by China or by North VIetnam. The principal
threat to most existing governments In
Southeast Asia, In short, seems t o arise from
within Southeast Asia at this time .
It seems to me that our presumption of a
primary danger to tbe Southeast Asian countries, which they themselves do not perceive,
does not provide a sound basis for U.S. policy.
Rather, It tends to create for this Nation the
role of self-appointed, great power protector
In an area In which a militant young nationalism speaks the common language ot
resistance to foreign Intrusion. It ls soberIng to recall, In this connection, that this Nation has never been an Asian power and, In
my judgment, It Is essential to avoid a further glissade Into that Ill-fitting role. Our
vital Interests wit h respect to the Asian mainland have always been peripheral. They are
peripheral now. They are likely to remain
peripheral In the future.
On the other hand, we have been and will
continue to be a Pacific power. VItal national Interests are Indeed, lodged In that
ocean. Four of our States border on the Pacific. In addition, one of t hem, Hawaii, lies
In the middle of that vast expanse of water.
We have territories and dependencies all over
the Pacific. The Aleutian Islanrls are n•rt of
the State of Aalska. American Samoa, Guam,
Wake, Johnston, Midway and the Howland,
Baker, and Jarvis Islands are dependencies
of the United States. The Trust Territory ot
the Pacific Islands, which we have adminis tered since the end of World War II, comprises over 2,000 Islands and atolls with a la!ld
area of 678 square miles scattered over 3 million square miles of the Pacl.tl.c.
As a Pacific power, we have and will continue to have a profound Interest In what
transpires In the western reaches of the
ocean. In my judgement, however, that Interest can best be expressed not by our Immersion In the regions ' Internal political atfairs but by an orderly shift to a restrained
and judicious participation, as on Pacific nation among several, In Its peacef~ development.
Indeed, It Is difficult to discern any other
reasonable course for this Nation In present
circumstances. It Is a new day In Asia. The
age In which foreign military dominance of
any Asian p eople was a practical possibility
has long since ended. Even the postwar period of one-sided dependency- most of It on
the United States-Is drawing to a close.
Civilized survival, not to speak of peace and
progress In the Western Pacific , may well depend on the timely emergence of a new age
of cooperation based on equality and on a
mutuality of responsibility, respect, and tolerance between this Nation and all the s tates
of Asia.
II. THE PRESmENT'S NEW ASIAN DOCTRINE

In the course of his recent trip, President
Nixon enunciated In the Guam Declaration a
new approach to Asia and the Western Pacific which seems to me to take cognizance
of the considerations that are outlined In the
Introductory section of this report. The PresIdent's Asian doctrine contains the following
precepts, as I Introduced them and as I Interpreted them to various :Asian leaders:
1. The United States will maintain Its
treaty commitments, 'but It Is anticipated
that Asian nations will be a-ble to handle
their own defense problems, perhaps with
some outside material assistance but without outside manpower. Nuclear threats are
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another matter, and such threats wllJ continue to be checked by counterpoised nuclear
capacity.
2. As a Paclt!c pOwer, the United States will
not turn Its •back on nations of the Western
Pacific and Asia; the countries of that region will not be denied a concerned and understand.lng ear In this Nation.
3. The United States will avoid the cr.eatlon
of situations In which there .Is such great
dependence on us that, lnevlt&bly, we become
enmeshed In what are essentially Asian problema and confilcts.
4. To the extent that material assistance
may be forthcoming from·the United States,
more emphasis will be placed on economic
help and less on military assistance.
5. The future role of the United States will
continue to be significant In the affairs of
Asia. It will be enacted, however, largely
In the economic realm and on the basis of
multilateral cooperation.
6. The United States will look with favor
on multilateral political, economic, and security arrangements among the Asian nations
and, where appropriate, will assist In effort&
which may be undertaken thereunder.
In.

JU:ACfiONS TO THE NEW

ASIAN DOCI'RINE

Achievement of many of the objectives
stated above Involves a reduction In the U.S.
presence In Southeast Asia. WhUe this report does not deal with VIetnam, It Is obvious that the war there Is the main cause
of the massive dimensions which the U.S.
presence bas attained. That the po88lbllltles
of diminution are bound up with the end
of that tragic confUct does not mean that
application of the new doctrine must await
the war's termination. Quite apart from VIetnam, there are other areas where contractions may be possible. Most Immediately,
under the new approach there Is the po881blllty of curbing what seem to be built-In
tendencies In the many-sided U.S. establishments In Asia to e:rpand the U .S . presence.
In general, the leaders of Asian countries
agree that the role of the United States
In Asian atralrs should shrink. Some uneasiness does exist that the pendulum will awing
too far, from overlnvolvement to noninvolvement. The fear Is that the United States may
leave the smaller Asian statee In Isolation and
under the shadow of one or anOther mo re
powerful neighbor.
There Is also some uncertainty as to what
the new doctrine will mean In apectflc terms.
This uncertainty Is understandable since
there was not, at the time of my visit, any
sign of a followthrough to the new doctrine.
Indeed, other than the transient stimulus
of the President's recent personal appearance, little, If any, change was visible. The
concepts, practices, and programs by which
U.S. missions In Asia have operated tor many
year remain the same.
Notwithstanding the President's recent
visit and Presidential stAtements to the contrary, some U.S . missions still expect this
Nation to continue as a major military fattor
In Southeast Asia after the conclusion of the
war In VIetnam. Developments within Southeast Asian countries are still referred to as
"vltal"to this Nation's Interests, "vital" 1mplying more of a commitment than can be
derived from a reasonable reading ot the
President's new approach. Ironically, In some
U.S. embassies an Inconsistency Is not seen
between budgetary requests for greatly Increased U.S. bllaterlll &881stance and, hence,
greater U.S. participation In the Indigenous
situation, on the one hand, and the admlnlatratlon's new doctrine on the other.
In short, there Is no Indication, as yet, of
when or how the size of the U.S. presence In
Asia Ia to be reduced In any significant degree. It Ia a fact that the only redUctions contemplated at the time of my visit were those
which might result from a continuance of
periodic blanket percentage cuts In personnel. These cuts were begun m?re than a yee.r

ago, not as a matter of policy so much as a
measure of economy and as a palliative for
balance-of-payments concerns.
It would appear, therefore, that the first
order of business under the new doctrine Is to
see to It that the President's new concepts are
reiterated and thoroughly explained throughout the U.S. departments and agencies concerned and that they are disseminated among
all U.S. officials In Southeast Asia. It would
appear, too, that directives which are both
clear and firm will have to emanate from
Washington If these concepts are to be applied etrectlvely and with necessary dlspatcll
by U.S. missions In Southeast Asia.
V . CONCLUDING COMMENTS

The President's new doctrine clearly calls
for a contraction of the ot!lclal U.S. presence
In Southeast Asia. In some Instances, the nations of the region have anticipated this
contraction; In all t he nations which I visIted, there Is understanding of Ita InevitabilIty. Most are ready for the transition and,
In general, welcome It, provided the U.S.
Interest does not dlsapJ>ear suddenly under
a tidal wave o! national retrenchment or
lndltrerence .
The President's doctrine, o! course, does
not carry In any sense the latter Implication.
Indeed, only by an utter disregard of our own
national Interests could we disengage completely our concern from the atralrs of the
Western Paclftc. Wit hout any such abrupt
witl;ldrawal , the re 1s ample room for a.n or-

derly contraction of the prevailing U.S . presence In Asia. Most pressing, there Is an Immediate need for restraints on the built-In
tendency of the presence t o grow
There Is room, for example, for the !ollowlng :
1. A c ontradiction of bilateral U.S. aid efforts and a shift to expanding U.S. participation In multilateral etrorts In the economic
development of the region.
2. A rigid and Immediate curb on military
aid and no deepening of our direct military
Involvement with any Asian government, to
be followed by a reexamination of longstandIng treaty commitments and their organizational substructures, n otably SEATO
3. Official encouragement and support of
commercial , cultural , techntcal, and all other
forms o! nonmilitary Interchange on a mutual basis, scaled to the level of the capac ity
and the clearly e:rpressed desires of the Asian
nations.
In my judgment, an Interpretation of the
administration's doctrine Into policies and
practices which follow the above lines would
be acceptable In most Southeast Asian nations. Nor Is It a matter of waiting for the
end of the war In VIetnam. To be sure, when
this costly and tragic enmeshment Is brought
to a close, the way will be !acllltated for
more rapid Qhange. As I have already Indicated above, however, and, as I have detailed
In specific recommendations to the President
In confidential reports, there Is much that
can be Initiated now In order to contract
and adjust American activities In Southeast
Asia to bring them Into line with his Guam
Declaration.
It Is necessary to reiterate, however, that
as of the time of my visit to the region, the
President's prono'Uncementa had brought no
follow-through In the U.S. mi88lons abroad.
Nor did they Indicate to me the receipt of
new guidance and Instructions from the
agencies of the executive branch. It would
seem to me, therefore, that If the President's
Initiative Is to precipitate the changes which
It promises. there Is 11 need for close collaboration between the responsible ot!lc1als In the
elected administration a.nd the Congress.
As a first step, It would be my suggestion
that an Immediate freeze be placed on all
official personnel Increases, millte.ry or civilIan, In Southeast Asia whether by Presldl\ntlal order, with strong Congressional support, or, lf necesse.ry, by legtlllatlon, sup-.

ported by the President, pending fUll st u dy

ot the wide range of func t ions which are
now pursued by U.S. Government agencies In
Southeast Asia. Some of these functions
which began many years ago appear mfltted or Ill-scaled to present need. A full
examination of this kind might well Involve
a Joint etrort of the President and the Congress, or It might Involve parallel studies
or multiple studies by one or the other. However It proceeds, this study should go forward, In my judgment, without delay. It Is
essential to the maintenance of a U.S. position In Southeast Asia which Is relevant to
our national Interests, t o the Interests of the
people of Asia and to the peace of the Pactflc.

Mr. MANSFIELD. May I say that the
Nixon doctrine, to me, means a low
profile, not just in Southeast Asia or in
east Asia, but also In all other parts of
the world, as the Senator from Vermont has said. The Nixon doctrine means
to me that troops will gradually be withdrawn from overseas in places such as
Korea, Vietnam, Thailand, Taiwan,
Okinawa, Japan, and the Philippine
Islands, and that onr bases will be reduced-they rtumber approximately 2,000
at the present time-and that this doctrine applies to Western Europe just as
it does to Asia.
May I say, also, that I concur with
the distinguished Senator from Vermont,
the ranking Republican In this body, in
his plea for a bipartisan conduct of our
foreign policy and closer consultation between the Executive and the Senate.
Somewhere, somehow, there must be the
beginnings of an end to the conflict in
which we are engaged, and that end
will have to be, In my opinion, not a .
miltary settlement, not a tit-for-tat. policy, but a negotiated settlement. Until
that negotiated settlement is found , the
fires of conflict will continue to blaze In
Indochina; and if the fires continue to
burn, what nation will then claim the
victory? All nations Involved will only
have lost.
So I join the Senator. I hope that
what he has had to ~;ay will be given consideration downtown, I hope that all of
us, regardless of our feelings , will recognize that there is no black and white
picture so far as Southeast Asia is concerned; that there are gray areas which
must be considered. Hopefully, there will
come a coordination and an accommodation and a sense · of cooperation which
will benefit us not as individuals, not the
parties we represent, but--to repeat what
I said in the beginnin~ and which I think
is the basis of the distinguished Senator's
speech-the welfare of the people of the
Nation.
Mr. AIKEN. Mr. President, I point out
again that, to me, the Nixon doctrine
means that we play as a member of the
team and not as a coach who assigns each
of the other members to the position
which we think. they should occupy.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Yes. Not leadership;
partnership would be better.

